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he had a right to testify but that he was 
under no obligation to do so. Addition-
ally, the defendant was told that if he did 
not testify, it would not be held against 
him. 
Determined t') speak in his own defense, 
Martin took the stand and offered his side 
of the story. Martin stated that he was 
"helping a friend move some furniture and 
was unaware that the syringe was in the 
truck." Id. at 600, 535 A.2d at 952-53. On 
cross-examination, the prosecution at-
tempted to impeach Martin's credibility 
by revealing a prior conviction for the 
possession of marijuana with the intent to 
distribute. Apparently unpersuaded by 
Martin's testimony, the jury found him 
guilty and the court sentenced him to four 
years in prison. 
On appeal, the issue was whether the 
advice and warning given were so inade-
quate in apprising the appellant of his fIfth 
amendment right against self-
incrimination that a prejudicial error was 
committed. Martin contended that hiS 
right against self-incrimination was vio-
lated because his election to testify was not 
based on a knowing and intelligent waiver. 
Specifically, he argued that as a pro se 
defendant, the trial court had a duty to 
inform him that "(1) if he took the witness 
stand, he could be impeached, and (2) the 
jury would be instructed as to the pre-
sumption of innocence if he elected not to 
testify." Id. at 600, 535 A.2d at 953. Thus, 
the more narrow question was whether 
the lack of such knowledge deprived the 
defendant of his ability to make an inform-
ed and intelligent waiver of his right 
against self-incrimination. 
The court of special appeals viewed the 
issue presented as one which essentially 
involved a question of balancing a pro se 
criminal defendant's right to be sufficient-
ly informed and the need to avoid impos-
ing an onerous burden on the trial court. 
Thus, while it is necessary to provide an 
unrepresented defendant with sufficient 
. advice to insure that an election to testify 
is voluntary and informed, the trial judge 
has no obligation to serve as defense coun-
sel. As noted, "[tlhe question then 
becomes, how much should the court say? 
How far should the court go?" Id. at 601, 
535 A.2d at 953. 
In Ste'Oens '0. State, 232 Md. 33, 192 A.2d 
73 (1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 886 (1963), 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland recog-
nized that "[mlost jurisdictions ... have 
held that failure by a trial court to advise 
a defendant not represented by counsel of 
his right to refuse to take the witness stand 
constitutes prejudicial error." Id. at 39,192 
A.2d at 77 (citing 79 A.L.R. 2d 643 (1961) 
and cases therein). The reason this require-
ment is imposed upon the trial court is to 
protect a defendant's ftfth amendment 
right to be free from compulsory self-
incrimination. As stated in State '0. McKen· 
zie, 17 Md. App. 563, 593, 303 A.2d 406, 
422 (1973), unrepresented "[dlefendants 
should not be called to the stand by the 
prosecutor or the judge; nor should they 
be led to believe that they are required or 
expected to take the stand." 
Thus, to call a pro se defendant to the 
witness stand without informing him of 
his right to refuse to testify constitutes 
reversible error. To avoid such error, it is 
essential that the defendant waive his privi-
lege against self-incrimination. Further-
more, in that the privilege against 
self-incrimination is a fundamental consti-
tutional right, the waiver must be a know-
ing and intentional one. Johnson '0. Zerbst, 
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Curtis '0. State, 
284 Md. 132, 143, 395 A.2d 464, 470 
(1978). The gist of the Johnson rule is that 
for a waiver to be valid, the defendant 
must be reasonably aware of what protec-
tion the right involves and must voluntari-
ly choose to forego that protection. It is 
clear then, that when a defendant chooses 
to testify on his own behalf, he waives his 
fIfth amendment right only if he has suffi-
cient knowledge as to the meaning of such 
a wavier. Without sufficient knowledge, 
the defendant cannot make a voluntary 
and intelligent decision to forego the pro-
tection and safeguards afforded by the 
right. Thus, where a defendant is not 
assisted by counsel, it is incumbent upon 
the court to insure that his decision to tes-
tify is an informed and voluntary one. 
In the instant case, the trial judge simply 
informed the defendant that he had a right 
to remain silent and that if he chose to 
exercise that right, it would not be held 
against him. The court of special appeals 
afftrmed the lower court and refused to 
require that pro se defendants should be 
warned of the perils of cross-examination 
and impeachment. In order to address 
both the interests and rights of pro se 
defendants and the obligations imposed 
upon a trial judge, the court concluded 
that a minimum amount of advice was all 
that was required. The court explained its 
holding as follows: 
Trial judges are commanded by both 
Constitutionally-based case law and 
spedftc rules of procedure (see Md. 
Rule 4-215) to inform unrepresented 
defendants of their right to counsel, to 
encourage them to obtain counsel, and 
to warn them of the hazards of pro-
ceeding without counsel. H a defen-
dant knowingly and voluntarily elects 
to disregard that advice and proceed 
without counsel, he cannot expect the 
judge to become his lawyer. Informing 
him that he has a right not to testify 
and that no inference of guilt can be 
drawn if he exercises that right suf-
ftces, we think, to allow him to make 
an intelligent-if not a wise-decision 
whether to testify • To go further, how-
ever, might involve the court, however 
subtle, in influencing that decision. 
Martin, at 603,535 A.2d at 954. 
The information which a trial judge 
must provide to a pro se defendant is now 
clear. Once the minimum required warn-
ings are given, however, the unrepresented 
defendant who elects to take the stand will 
be deemed to have voluntarily executed a 
valid waiver of his right against compulso-
ry self-incrimination. 
-Gerard M. Waites 
Prout v. State: WITNESS' PRIOR 
CONVICTIONS OF CRIMES 
INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE 
NOT ADMISsmLE FOR 
IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES 
In Prout '0. State, 311 Md. 348, 535 A.2d 
445 (1988), the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held that prior convictions of a 
witness may be admissible for impeach-
ment purposes only if the conviction was 
for either an infamous crime or a lesser 
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crime which bears upon the witness' credi-
bility. In reaching its holding, the court af-
firmed a decision of the Circuit Court for 
Baltimore City which refused to admit 
proof of a witness' convictions of prostitu-
tion and solicitation for prostitution (solic-
itation) for impeachment purposes. 
In Prout, Lewis D. Prout, the appellant, 
was charged with assault and robbery with 
a deadly weapon. Subsequent to the selec-
tion of the jury, Prout's counsel made a 
motion in limine to advise the court of his 
intention to cross-examine the complai-
nant, the state's sole witness, regarding her 
prior convictions. Id. at 351, 535 A.2d at 
446. Specifically, Prout's counsel sought to 
cross-examine the complainant for her 
convictions of grand theft, shoplifting, 
prostitution, failure to appear in court, so-
licitation, resisting arrest, violation of pro-
bation, and contempt of court. Id. The 
state objected to the motion in limine stat-
ing that "there was nothing in the com-
plainant's record to indicate that the 
offenses listed therein resulted in convic-
tions." Id. at 352, 535 A.2d at 447. 
Upon the trial judge's questioning, the 
prosecutor admitted that he was uncertain 
whether the aforementioned offenses 
resulted in actual convictions. According-
ly, the trial judge decided that he would 
not permit any evidence for impeachment 
purposes of any prior offenses which did 
not result in convictions. The judge stated 
further that he would allow the complai-
nant to be cross-examined about her theft 
and shoplifting charges if it was shown 
that she was in fact convicted for these 
offenses. The judge cautioned, however, 
that 
[if] it turns out that this woman has 
been convicted of theft and shoplift-
ing ... , then on cross-examination 
when you ask her about her prior con-
victions, do not ask her what she has 
been convicted of. Lead her and say, 
"Is it not true that you have been con-
victed of theft and shoplifting?" et cet· 
era, so ... we will not inadvertently 
get into other inadmissable convic-
tions. 
Id. at 353, 535 A.2d at 447. 
During the trial, Prout's counsel cross-
examined the complainant by asking her 
leading questions about her grand theft 
and shoplifting convictions but neither 
proffered nor mentioned her prostitution 
and solicitation convictions. Id. The jury 
found Prout guilty of assault and Prout ap-
pealed to the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland. In an unreported per curiam 
opinion, the court of special appeals af-
firmed the decision of the circuit court. 
Id. (citing Prout 't'. State, No. 79, Septem-
ber Term, 1985; filed September 23, 1985). 
The court of appeals then granted cer-
tiorari to both parties to review the ques-
tions presented in the case. 
On appeal, Prout's counsel asserted that 
the trial court erred in excluding the com-
plainant's prostitution and solicitation 
convictions for impeachment purposes, 
maintaining that the crimes involved 
"moral turpitude" and, therefore, the trial 
judge was without discretion to exclude 
them. Id. at 354, 535 A.2d at 448. The issue 
presented before the court was whether 
prior convictions, allegedly involving 
moral turpitude, are admissible per se for 
impeaching the credibility of a witness. 
The court of appeals addressed this issue 
by looking at the legislative history of im-
peachment by prior conviction in 
Maryland. At common law, the court 
noted, an individual convicted of an infa-
mous crime was completely disqualified 
from testifying. In an attempt to eliminate 
the harshness of this common law rule, the 
Maryland General Assembly enacted 
Chapter 109 of the Acts of 1864 which is 
now embodied in Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 
Code Ann. § 10-905 (1984). See Prout at 
359, 535 A.2d at 450. This statute provides 
in pertinent part that "[e]vidence is 
admissible to prove ... the fact of [a 
witness'] conviction of an infamous 
crime." Id. at 358-59, 535 A.2d at 450. 
Thus, while a witness convicted of an infa-
mous crime is no longer disqualified from 
testifying, his testimony is subject to im-
peachment by his conviction of an infa-
mous crime. 
Upon reviewing the legislative history of 
Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 10-905, 
the court concluded that "the legislative 
purpose behind Maryland's impeachment 
statute requires that the crimes admissible 
per se. .. be limited to those crimes within 
the common law definition of 
infamous' ". Prout, at __ , 535 A.2d at 
~ At common law, only "treason, 
felony, perjury, forgery and those other 
offenses classified generally as crimen falsi" 
were considered infamous. Id. at 360, 535 
A.2d at 450. (citing Garitee 't'. Bond, 102 
Md. 379, 383, 62 A. 631, 633 (1905». In 
regard to Prout's moral turpitude argu-
ment, the court of appeals stated that the 
label "moral turpitude" serves no purpose 
for impeachment purposes in the context 
of § 10-905 other than acting as an adjec-
tive describing those crimes that "our soci-
ety finds particularly repugnant." Id. at 
360, 535 A.2d at 451. The court held, 
therefore, that the phrase "moral turpi-
tude" does not provide another class of 
crimes separate and apart from infamous 
crimes under Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code 
Ann. § 10-905 (1984). Furthermore, the 
court noted that no Maryand case concern-
ing impeachment by prior conviction 
accorded any significance to the term 
"moral turpitude" until Ricketts 't'. State, 
291 Md. 701, 436 A.2d 906 (1981). See Pro· 
ut, at 361-62, 535 A.2d at 451. 
In Ricketts, the trial court allowed the 
prosecutor to impeach Ricketts' testimony 
with his prior conviction for indecent 
exposure.Id. at 362, 535 A.2d at 451. On 
appeal, Ricketts' asserted that under 
Maryland law, only infamous crimes, 
crimes of moral turpitude and lesser crimes 
affecting the credibility of the witness 
were admissible for purposes of impeach-
ment. Id. Ricketts argued that because his 
indecent exposure conviction did not fall 
into any of these categories, the trial court 
erred in allowing the state to use his prior 
conviction against him for impeachment 
purposes. Id. 
In response to Ricketts' argument, the 
court of appeals held that a previous con-
viction for purposes of impeachment need 
not be limited to infamous crimes or those 
involving moral turpitude but could also 
include convictions for a lesser crime if the 
convictions bear on the witness' credibili-
ty. Id. at 362, 535 A.2d at 452 (citing 
Ricketts, at 707-08,436 A.2d at 909-10) (em-
phasis added». Unfortunately, in its effort 
to be thorough, the court of appeals in 
Ricketts, by its own admission, "grafted 
onto the [impeachment] statute the con-
cept of a crime of moral turpitude." Id. at 
362-63, 535 A.2d at 452. However, upon 
re-examining the legislative history of Md. 
Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 10-905 
(1984), the Prout court concluded that the 
legislature had no intention of creating a 
class of infamous crimes known as crimes 
of moral turpitude. Id. at 363, 535 A.2d at 
452. As a result, the court overruled Rick· 
etts to the extent that it was inconsistent 
with its holding in Prout. The court then 
upheld the circuit court's refusal to allow 
Prout's counsel to impeach the complai-
nant by her convictions for prostitution 
and solicitation, finding that such convic-
tions were not for infamous crimes but 
rather for lesser crimes, the admissibility 
of which was within the discretion of the 
trial judge. 
Thus, the Prout court makes clear that a 
prior conviction is admissible per se for 
impeachment purposes if it was a convic-
tion for an infamous crime at common law 
(i.e., a felony or a crimen falsi), whereas, a 
lesser crime may be used for impeachment 
purposes only if it reflects on the witness' 
truthfulness and veracity, the determina-
tion of which is to be left to the sound dis-
cretion of the trial judge. 
-Mark Scott Ledford 
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